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FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE-RULES 609(A) AND 403-WITNESSES-IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CRIMINAL CONVICTION-The Fed-

eral District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania has
held that evidence of a prior criminal conviction can not be used to
impeach the credibility of a plaintiff in a civil suit.
Tussel v. Witco Chemical Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
Jacob F. Tussel instituted a civil action against Witco Chemical
Corporation in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania.' Tussel, the driver of a tanker truck,
claimed that he was injured while unloading carbolic acid due to
the negligence of a Witco employee.2 Prior to trial, Tussel filed a

motion in limine seeking an order barring Witco from introducing
into evidence, for impeachment purposes, Tussel's 1978 guilty plea
to a charge of conspiracy to import a controlled substance.$ Judge
Mencer held that evidence of Tussel's prior narcotics conviction
4
was inadmissible in this action.
Judge Mencer noted first that the broad question of admissibility of prior criminal convictions 5 into evidence is covered by Rule
609(a)6 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (F.R.E.), and began his
analysis with F.R.E. 609(a)(2). This section, he explained, allows
the introduction of evidence of prior convictions for impeachment
purposes if the crimes involved dishonesty or false statement.'
1. Tussel v. Witco Chemical Corp., 555 F. Supp. 979 (W.D. Pa. 1983).
2. Id. at 980.
3. Id. The charge to which Tussel pleaded guilty carries with it the potential for imprisonment in excess of one year. Id. See Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, 21
U.S.C. §§ 952, 960, 963 (1981).
4. 555 F. Supp. at 985.
5. The court noted that for purposes of impeachment a plea of guilty is equivalent to a
conviction. Id. at 980 n.2. See United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d 535, 545 n.32 (D.C. Cir.

1980); C. TORCIA,

WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

§ 339 at 224 and n.18 (12th ed. 1975).

6. FED. R. EVID. 609(a) provides:
(a) General Rule. For purpose of attacking credibility of a witness evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by
public record during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting the evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. EviD. 609(a).
7. 555 F. Supp at 980.
8. Id. at 980-81.
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Further, Judge Mencer noted that no judicial discretion is involved
in the automatic admission of evidence of prior convictions of such
crimes for impeachment purposes." Because of their nature, he
continued, these crimes are considered highly probative of one's
credibility.10 For assistance in defining dishonesty and false statement, Judge Mencer turned to the Conference Committee's Report
on the Final Compromise Version of the Rule (Conference Committee's Report)." He observed that the Conference Committee's
Report defined crimes involving dishonesty or false statement as
"crimes such as perjury, subornation of perjury, false statement,
criminal fraud, embezzlement or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness or falsification
bear12
'
ing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully.

The court considered the question of whether a narcotics conviction is such a crime.13 A review of authority from other jurisdictions revealed two opposing views. The court explained that the
first view, embraced by the Eighth Circuit in United States v.
5
Hastings14 and the Second Circuit in United States v. Hayes,

suggests that although a narcotics conviction is not a crime requiring fraud, it may be accompanied by fraud." Under this approach,
if the underlying facts of the case show fraud or dishonesty, evidence of a conviction of such a crime falls within the ambit of
F.R.E. 609(a)(2) and should be admitted into evidence. 7 The court
9.
10.
11.

See id. at 981 n.3.
Id. at 981.
Id. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 7098.

12. 555 F. Supp. at 981. See CON?. REP. No. 1597, supra note 11, at 7103. Judge
Mencer quoted BLACK'S definition of crimen falsi:
The term involves the element of falsehood, and includes everything which has a tendency to injuriously affect the administration of justice by the introduction of falsehood and fraud. A crime less than a felony that by its nature tends to cast doubt on
the veracity of one who commits it. This phrase is also used as a general designation
of a class of offenses, including all such as involved deceit or falsification; e.g. forgery,
counterfeiting, using false weights or measures, perjury, etc. Includes forgery, perjury,
subornation of perjury, and offenses affecting the public administration of justice.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

446 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).

13. 555 F. Supp. at 981.
14. 577 F.2d 38 (8th Cir. 1978).
15. 553 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867 (1977).
16. 555 F. Supp. at 981-82.
17. Id. at 982. The court quoted language from the Second Circuit's decision: "Appellant's conviction was for the importation of cocaine, a crime in the uncertain middle category - neither clearly covered nor clearly excluded by the second prong test [F.R.E.
609(a)(2)]-and thus one to which the Government must present specific facts relating as to
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then considered the view adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Lewis,18 which requires that dishonesty or
false statement be an element of the crime. 9 The Lewis court
found that if an offense did not contain an element involving dishonesty, false statement, or fraud, the court would not look for actual dishonesty, false statement or fraud in the underlying facts of
the case. 0 Judge Mencer found this to be the better view. 21 According to Judge Mencer, proponents of this approach reason that
if the alternative position is carried to its logical end, prior convictions of all intentional crimes would be admissible for impeachment purposes.2 2 He found this to be at odds with Congress' intent.23 Judge Mencer further asserted that Congress clearly stated
that only crimes in the nature of crimen falsi should be admissible
under F.R.E. 609(a)(2), not all criminal offenses.24 Congress, he
noted, chose a narrow range of crimes which it considered peculiarly probative of credibility.2" A narrow application of F.R.E.
609(a)(2), such as the District of Columbia Circuit's approach, he
submitted, was, therefore, consistent with congressional intent.2 6
From an administrative point of view, Judge Mencer also noted
that this approach provides the "most practical, efficient and consistent manner in which a trial judge can utilize the rule.

'2 7

Find-

crime28

to which Tussel pleaded guilty did not contain
ing that the
an element of dishonesty or false statement, he held that the evidence was inadmissible under F.R.E. 609(a)(2).29
Judge Mencer then considered the applicability of F.R.E.
609(a)(1). 30 This section, he explained, allows the admission of evidishonesty or false statement." Id. (quoting United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 867 (1977)).
18. 626 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
19. 555 F. Supp. at 982.
20. Id. See 626 F.2d at 946.
21. 555 F. Supp. at 982.
22. Id.
23. Id. The court quoted with approval the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation of FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(2): "Although it may be argued that any willful violation of law
. . . evinces a lack of character and a disregard for all legal duties, including the obligation
of an oath, Congress has not accepted that expansive theory." Id. (quoting United States v.
Millings, 535 F.2d 121, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
24. 555 F. Supp. at 982.
25. Id. See CONF. Rm. No. 1597, supra note 11, at 7103.
26. 555 F. Supp. at 982.
27. Id.
28. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 963 (1981).
29. 555 F. Supp. at 982.
30. Id. See supra note 6.
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dence of a prior conviction if the offense which the individual committed was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year under the law under which the individual was convicted.
When such conviction is present, the deciding court must then determine whether the probative value of admitting this evidence
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant."1
Once again, in deciding the instant case, the court's inquiry began with the Conference Committee's Report s2 which stated that
the F.R.E. 609(a)(1) balancing standard should be utilized to exclude evidence only when the prejudicial impact upon the defendant warrants exclusion.s The court observed that this view has
been followed in numerous decisions.3 " Based on its analysis of the
Conference Committee's Report and reported decisions, the court
concluded that Congress generally favored admission of evidence
of prior convictions for impeachment purposes, but intended to
limit the special protection of F.R.E. 609(a)(1) exclusively to a single class of witnesses: criminal defendants.3 5 The court found no
mandate in the language or legislative history of F.R.E. 609(a)(1)
which justified a blind or mechanical application of the rule. 6
The Conference Committee's Report specifically stated that all
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement are automatically
admissible, and admission of evidence of conviction of other offenses is controlled by the F.R.E. 609(a)(1) balancing standard if a
31. 555 F. Supp. at 982.
32. Id. See supra note 11.
33. 555 F. Supp. at 982-83. The Conference Committee Report states in relevant part:
With regard to the discretionary standard established by paragraph (1) of rule 609(a),
the Conference determined that the prejudicial effect to be weighed against the probative value of the conviction is specifically the prejudicial effect to the defendant.
The danger of prejudice to a witness other than the defendant (such as injury to the
witness' reputation in his community) was considered and rejected by the Conference
as an element to be weighed in determining admissibility. It was the judgment of the
Conference that the danger of prejudice to a nondefendant witness is outweighed by
the need for the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible. Such evidence should only be excluded where it presents a danger
of improperly influencing the outcome of the trial by persuading the trier of fact to
convict the defendant on the basis of his prior criminal record.
CONF. REP. No. 1597, supra note 11, at 7103.
34. 555 F. Supp. at 983. See, e.g., United States v. Nevitt, 563 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979) (defendant on trial for conspiring to transport falsely made
securities across state lines was entitled to impeach prosecution witnesses by evidence of
their prior convictions); United States v. Martin, 562 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (noting that
all prior convictions of prosecution witnesses were admissible for impeachment purposes
under FED. R. EvID. 609(a)).
35. 555 F. Supp. at 983-84.
36. Id. at 983.
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criminal defendant witness is being prejudiced. It is silent as to the
standard to be used in other situations.3 7 The court determined
that F.R.E. 609(a)(1) does not specifically preclude application of
F.R.E. 403,8 and noted that a rigid application of F.R.E. 609(a) is
not in the best interests of the judicial system or the parties. 9 The
court was unable to find any prior cases which had addressed the
precise issue before it: admissibility of evidence of a prior conviction for importation of narcotics to impeach the credibility of a
plaintiff in a civil action.40 Judge Mencer found guidance, however,
in criminal cases which have dealt with the admission of evidence
of prior convictions of non-defendant witnesses for impeachment
purposes."1 Evidence of prior convictions was excluded in these
cases by applying F.R.E. 403.2 The court found that F.R.E.
609(a)(1) grants special protection to criminal defendants. It then
noted that F.R.E. 102 and 611 require a construction of the rules
which secures a fair administration of justice and that questioning
be conducted so as to ascertain the truth and avoid harassment
and embarrassment of witnesses.4 3 To meet these ends, the court

determined that F.R.E. 403 must be the standard used to determine the admissibility of this evidence."
Judge Mencer then decided whether the evidence should be admitted under the F.R.E. 403 balancing standard.4 5 He thus balanced the tendency of the evidence to aid the jury in deciding the
case on its merits and the tendency of the evidence to cause the
jury to make its "decision on something other than the established
propositions in the case." 6 Judge Mencer concluded that this evidence was demonstrably more prejudicial than probative on the issue of credibility and held it inadmissible."
37. Id. See CONF. REP. No. 1597, supra note 11, at 7103.
38. Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
39. 555 F. Supp. at 984.
40. Id.
41. See United States v. Dixon, 547 F.2d 1079, 1083 n.4 (9th Cir. 1976) and United
States v. Jackson, 405 F. Supp. 938, 943 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
42. 555 F. Supp. at 984.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. See supra note 38.
46. 555 F. Supp. at 985 (quoting Carter v. Hewitt, 617 F.2d 961, 972 (3d Cir. 1980)).
See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE V 403[03], at 403-15 to -17 (1978).
47. 555 F. Supp. at 985.
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At common law, conviction of any felony or misdemeanor involving dishonesty made that individual incompetent to testify."' As
the common law developed this changed; all men regardless of
their prior criminal acts became competent to testify. 49 Prior convictions, however, could be used to impeach the individual's credibility. 0 The majority rule, followed by the federal courts before
the passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence and most state courts
at one time or another, allowed the introduction of evidence of
prior convictions if the crime was a felony or involved dishonesty
or false statement.5 1 This rule w tailored to provide the jury with
as much evidence as possible on the issue of the witness'
52
credibility.
The first significant departure from this view came in 1965 when
the District of Columbia Circuit Court decided Luck v. United
States.5" In Luck, the court chose to abandon the majority position
in the case of criminal defendants who take the stand on their own
behalf. The court held that it is within the discretion of the trial
judge to exclude evidence of a prior conviction of a defendant-witness if the evidence is offered for impeachment purposes.5 4 A new
and somewhat conflicting philosophy was at the root of this departure from established law. The majority view placed a premium on
giving the jury as much evidence as possible on the issue of credibility, while the Luck view placed a premium on avoiding prejudice
to criminal defendants, at the expense of excluding some relevant
evidence. A criminal defendant could, in fact, choose not to take
the stand on his own behalf if the prosecutor could then expose the
defendant's prior convictions and seriously prejudice his case.
Judge McGowan, writing for the Luck court, explained, "[i]t is
more important to the search for truth in a particular case for the
jury to hear the defendant's story than to know of a prior conviction."5 5 This dichotomy was temporarily removed in 1970, when
Congress reinstated the majority rule in the District of Columbia
by revising the District of Columbia Code.56
48.
49.
50.
51.

MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 64 (E. W. Cleary ed. 1972).
Id.
Id. § 43.
Id.
52. 3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §§ 314-15 (1977).
53. 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
54. Id. at 768.
55. Id. at 769.
56. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1973) (this statute provides for the admission of
evidence of prior criminal convictions if the offense "(A) was punishable by death or impris-
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The introduction of the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence in
1973 renewed the contest of conflicting philosophies: protecting
criminal defendants versus providing the jury with as much evidence as possible on the issue of witness credibility. The first draft
of F.R.E. 609(a) in March, 1969 followed the majority position and
allowed evidence of any conviction of a felony387 or a crime involving dishonesty or false statement to be introduced for impeachment purposes.58 The second draft in March, 1971, however, was
strongly influenced by Luck, and required that the probative value
of the evidence be greater than its prejudicial effect for either type
of conviction (felony or one involving dishonesty or false statement) to be admitted into evidence.59 This language was removed
in the final draft in December, 1972 and the language of the first
draft was reinstated."6 The House Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary
revised the rule and gave it a "Luck" flavor; the subcommittee allowed the exercise of judicial discretion only when the crime was a
felony not involving dishonesty or false statement. 1 The full
onment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted or (B) involved
dishonesty or false statement (regardless of the punishment)"). There were no further
amendments to this section between 1970 and 1973.
57. Under federal law a felony is any crime punishable by death or imprisonment for
more than one year. See 18 U.S.C. § 1(1) (1979).
58. The first draft of proposed FED. R. Evm. 609(a) provided:
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime is admissible but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was
convicted, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.

2

THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, LEGISLATIVE HisToRIEs AND RELATED DocuMENTS, Doc.

5 at 123 (J. Bailey and 0. Trelles, ed. 1980).
59. The second draft provided:
General Rule. For the purposes of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime, except on a plea of nolo contendere, is admissible
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one
year under the law under which he was convicted or (2) involved dishonesty or false
statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Id. Doc. 6 at 77.
60. Id. Doc. 7 at 21. See supra note 58 for text of the first draft.
61. The subcommittee's revision provided:
General Rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that
he has been convicted of a crime is admissible only if the crime (1) was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year, unless the court determines that the
danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of the conviction, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement.
H. REP. No. 93-65, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973).
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House Committee on the Judiciary, in turn, eliminated the use of
any felony not involving dishonesty or false statement for impeachment purposes. 2 This version was passed by the House of
Representatives. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary amended
the House-passed version of the rule to allow impeachment of defendant-witnesses only if the'probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Other witnesses received no such protection. A defendant-witness could still be impeached by evidence
of crimes involving dishonesty or false statement.6 3 On the Senate
floor, this special balancing standard was removed, and a version of
the rule embracing the majority position was passed.4 A HouseSenate conference committee met and agreed on a compromise
which is the present F.R.E. 609(a). 5 Both houses of Congress approved this compromise and the Federal Rules of Evidence were
enacted. 66
The preceding discussion shows that Congress' intent, which was
all important to the disposition of Tussel, is a very slippery thing.
As is often the case, the voice of Congress is not a lone strong baritone, but a confusing cacophony. A careful reading of the legislative history, however, provides some guidance. Several legislators
experienced problems defining what was meant by "crimes involving dishonesty or false statement." A debate on the House floor
preceding passage of the final compromise version of the rules illustrates this confusion. Views expressed ranged from "crimen
falsi" to "moral turpitude" to "criminality. ' 67 Representative Hogan made the point that even if crimen falsi is accepted as the
definition, the issue is not closed. Crimes which are crimen falsi in
one jurisdiction may not be crimen falsi in another. 8 Despite this
62. Id. The full House Committee's version read: "General Rule. For the purpose of
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is
admissible only if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement." Id.
63. The Senate Judiciary Committee's amended version provided in pertinent part
that evidence of a prior conviction is admissible if:
(2) in the case of a witness other than the accused, [the crime] was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, unless the court determines that the prejudicial value of the evidence outweighs its probative value in which case the evidence shall be excluded.
S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974).
64. CONF. REP. No. 1597, supra note 11, at 7102.
65.
66.
67.

See supra note 6.
28 U.S.C. app. (1976).
See 120 CONG. REc. H2375-2381 (1974).

68. Representative Hogan commented:
Unless one practices in a jurisdiction which has statutorily defined crimen falsi, the
common law definition of "any crime which may injuriously affect the administration
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variety of opinion, there is support for the view that the traditional
definition of crimen falsi was intended by Congress as the definition of "crimes involving dishonesty or false statement,"'6 that is,
only crimes that require dishonesty or false statement as one of
their elements. The Conference Committee's Report seems to support this view. 0 In addition, courts have traditionally refused to
allow more than the name of the crime, its classification and the
associated punishment to be introduced into evidence when a prior
conviction is introduced for impeachment purposes.71 Although
this rule is judicially authored and may be changed at any time,
there is a reluctance to allow long discussion of underlying circumstances necessary to show "dishonesty or false statement" when it
is not an element of the crime. This is consistent with the general
71
policy of the rules to promote judicial economy.
The intent of Congress is more readily discernible when deciding
the question to which witnesses F.R.E. 609(a) applies. There is no
doubt that the established law before F.R.E. 609(a) applied to witnesses in civil as well as criminal trials.7 8 Clearly, Congress was
mainly concerned about prejudice to criminal defendant-witnesses,74 but there is no indication that it thereby intended to exof justice, by the introduction of falsehood or fraud" is applicable. This definition has
been held to include forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery, conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness or to accuse of a
crime, obtaining money under false pretenses, stealing, moral turpitude, shoplifting,
intoxication, petit larceny, jury tampering, embezzlement and filing a false estate tax
return. In other jurisdictions, some of these offenses have been found not to fit the
crimen falsi definition.
Id. at 2376 (remarks of Rep. Hogan).
69. Id. at 2380 (remarks of Rep. Danielson). The Senate appeared to have accepted
this definition as there was no debate on the subject. Following debate over the Judiciary
Committee's version of the rules, FED. R. EvIn. 609(a) was amended to allow all felonies to
be used for impeachment purposes. The whole question became a moot one. See 120 CONG.
REc. 37075-37083 (1974).
70. CONF. REP. No. 1597, supra note 11, at 7103 (the report states, in relevant part,
"[T]he Congress means crimes... the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify
truthfully").
71. See generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507(c) (1957 & Supp. 1981); 3 D. Louism.L &
C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 319 (1977). See, e.g., United States v. Wolf, 561 F.2d 1376
(10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Dow, 457 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1972).
72. See FED. R. EVID. 102 which provides: "These rules shall be construed to secure
fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay and promotion of
growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained
and proceedings justly determined." Id.
73. See generally 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 507 (1957 & Supp. 1981). This note refers to
civil and criminal cases alike.
74. See CONF. RaP. No. 1597, supra note 11, at 7103.
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clude witnesses in civil trials from the reach of F.R.E. 609(a). To
the contrary, during the House debate Representative Hogan
stated, "[F.R.E. 609(a)] applies in civil cases as well as criminal
cases to all witnesses. 7 He was not contradicted by his colleagues.
At a different point in the same debate, Representative Wiggins
suggested that civil and criminal areas be handled by different
rules; he was, however, unsupported by his fellow representatives. 6
In addition to this legislative authority, commentators have
agreed that no distinction was intended. McCormick's Handbook
of the Law of Evidence, when discussing F.R.E. 609(a) states, "in
civil cases or against prosecution witnesses such crimes (punishable
by death or imprisonment in excess of one year) are useable without the weighing process.
7

' 77

Judge Weinstein

9

8

and Louisell and

Mueller similarly note in their respective evidence treatises that
F.R.E. 609(a) applies to civil cases as well as to criminal cases. Finally, the Fifth Circuit in Shingleton v. Armor Velvet Corp.80 and
Howard v. Gonzales"1 had no qualms about using F.R.E. 609(a) to
decide admissibility, for impeachment purposes in a civil case, of
evidence of a prior criminal conviction.
The Tussel court seems to have reached a wise and reasonable
solution to the problem before it. It is a solution that furthers the
modern view that relevancy alone cannot govern admissibility of
evidence, but that considerations of fairness must also factor into
the decision of admissibility. As the discussion above indicates,
however, several members of Congress made clear during the
course of the House debate that F.R.E. 609(a) was to apply to civil
as well as to criminal trials. The Tussel court makes no mention of
this in its analysis, and presumably did not have this research
before it. Instead, the court determined that Congress meant to
exclude civil trials completely from the reach of F.R.E. 609(a).
75.
76.
77.
1982).
78.
79.

120 CONG. REC. H2379 (daily ed. February 6, 1974) (statement of Rep. Hogan).
Id. (statement of Rep. Wiggins).
MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 43 (E. W. Cleary ed. Supp.
3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE

609[07] (1982).

3 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 316 (1977).

80. 621 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1980) (in an action for fraudulent misrepresentation and
breach of a distributorship contract the court admitted evidence of defendant's prior felony
conviction for his part in a false pretenses scheme for impeachment purposes under FED. R.
EvID. 609(a)).
81. 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981). In an action for damages caused by beating and unlawful arrest, the court of appeals approved the trial court's use of discretion under FED. R.
EVID. 609(a) in refusing to allow the defendant to impeach plaintifrs credibility by introducing evidence of plaintiff's 1966 conviction for theft.
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From this precarious starting point, the court then determined
that F.R.E. 403 was the operative rule.
The Tussel court could have reached the same result with a different analysis. An alternative line of argument would begin by
recognizing that F.R.E. 609(a) applies to both civil and criminal
trials, thereby furthering Congress' expressed intent. The argument would continue by noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence
cannot be read as isolated rules; together they form a comprehensive system.82 The Federal Rules of Evidence may be imagined, in
part, as a series of sieves; evidence must pass through each to be
admissible. Though evidence may meet the admissibility requirements of one rule, it may not meet the requirements of another
rule which speaks to the same issue. In Tussel, the sieves through
which evidence must pass are F.R.E. 609(a) and F.R.E. 403. The
prejudice to a criminal defendant is the only prejudice to be balanced by F.R.E. 609(a)(1), and there is no criminal defendant in a
civil trial; therefore, F.R.E. 609(a)(1) will not function as a bar to
admissibility in the present case. Presence of a criminal defendant,
of course, has no effect on the admissibility of prior convictions
under F.R.E. 609(a)(2). Prior convictions are equally admissible in
civil and criminal cases under F.R.E. 609(a)(2). Since F.R.E. 609(a)
does not present an impediment to the admission of this evidence,
the analysis must shift to F.R.E. 403. This evidence may then be
excluded under F.R.E. 403, which the Tussel court did."3 This approach furthers the intent of Congress, while reaching essentially
the same result as the court in the instant case. In addition, the
traditional canons of statutory interpretation are employed by construing the Rules as a whole,8 and the overall purposes of the
Rules, as outlined in F.R.E. 102,85 are satisfied.
Oddly enough, Congress, the courts and commentators have
been silent on the issue of whether the scope of F.R.E. 403 includes
F.R.E. 609(a). This issue was raised by Judge Friendly in his testimony before the House Subcommittee, but unfortunately Congress
did not discuss the subject further.8 6 Though aware of the exis82. See Younger, Three Essays on Character and Credibility Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 5 HoFSTRA L. REV. 7, 18 (1976) ("I should think that a federal judge will
take the Federal Rules of Evidence as a system, not as a set of independent provisions to be
applied discretely").
83. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
84. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 345 (1957).
85. See supra note 72.
86. PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE, SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
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tence of F.R.E. 403, Congress did not draw it into its debate on
F.R.E. 609(a). It discussed the applicability of other
rulesaT-F.R.E. 404(b) for example. 88 Congress could have said that
a prior conviction offered for impeachment purposes is a special
type of evidence which is beyond the scope of F.R.E. 403; it did
not. Reading an intent to exclude F.R.E. 609(a) from the scope of
F.R.E. 403 into Congress' actions, however, arguably runs contrary
to the congressionally endorsed policy of F.R.E. 403, that evidence
despite its relevance may be excluded on fairness grounds.8 9
F.R.E. 403, on its face, applies to all evidence.90 The commentators, however, have been reluctant to adopt this view. Such eminent scholars as Wright and Graham express the view that F.R.E.
609(a) is beyond the scope of F.R.E. 403.91 Louisell and Mueller
note that it is "entirely possible" that F.R.E. 403 cannot be used to
exclude evidence admissible under F.R.E. 609(a).2 Judge Weinstein declares this to be an open question in his treatise.9 " Professor Irving Younger, on the other hand, has suggested that what
Congress really meant to say is that the
F.R.E. 609(a) standard is
94
the same as the F.R.E. 403 standard.
Courts have almost unanimously held that F.R.E. 609(a)(2) is
beyond the scope of F.R.E. 403. 9" Authority is less plentiful and
TIvES, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 252 (1973) (testimony of Judge Harry J. Friendly).
87. See 120 CONG. REC. S37081 (comments of Sen. Hart) (1974); Id. at H2379-2380
(comments of Reps. Holtzman and Danielson).
88. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b).
89. See Advisory Committee Notes to the Federal Rule of Evidence 403, FED. R. EVID.
403.
90. See supra note 38.
91. 22 C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5214 (1978).
92. 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 126 (1977).
93. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1 609[07] (1982).
94. See Younger, supra note 82, at 12. "Simplicity is a great and underrated virtue, in
whose name I dare hope that Congress will some day amend Rule 609 along these lines: Any
witness may be impeached with convictions, subject to the judge's discretion under Rule
403." Id.
95. See United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980). The court quoted the
following language from the Conference Committee's Report in deciding that FED. R. EVID.
609(a)(2) is not within the scope of FED. R. EvID. 403: "[Tlhus judicial discretion granted
with respect to the admissibility of other prior convictions is not applicable to those involving dishonesty or false statement." 615 F.2d at 279. See also United States v. Kiendra, 663
F.2d 349 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Leyra, 659 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
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less clear, however, when F.R.E. 609(a)(1) is at issue. The First
Circuit in Furtado v. Bishop" refused to rule on the question of
whether the trial judge has discretion to exclude evidence admissible under F.R.E. 609(a)(1) by invoking F.R.E. 403.' 7 The Ninth
Circuit in United States v. Dixon," noted in dictum that it is
"conceivable" that in some cases F.R.E. 403 might afford trial
courts discretion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction when a
criminal defendant is not the one prejudiced."9 Research reveals no
other cases which have addressed this issue.
By no measure is the volume or intensity of precedent and opinion overwhelming. A court following the proposed argument could
not cite much authority in its favor, nor would it find strong authority in opposition. Though the proposed argument is not flawless, it has certain advantages including: adherence to the intent of
Congress, adherence to the policies, spirit and text of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and an opportunity to contribute to a relatively
open area of law. These advantages seem to outweigh the sole apparent disadvantage of a lack of supportive authority and
precedent.
Judge Mencer has furthered the role that fairness and prejudice
play in determining the admissibility of evidence, consistent with
the policies of the Federal Rules of Evidence and modern scholarly
thought. Perhaps courts confronted with this question in the future and favoring this result will consider this alternative argument
when making their decisions.
Michael J. Heilman

v. Coats, 652 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
96. 604 F.2d 80 (1st Cir. 1979).
97. The court noted that defendant's argument that FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1) was beyond the scope of FED. R. EvID. 403 might be legitimate. Id. at 8.
98. 547 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976).
99. Id. at 1083 n.4.

